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ABSTRACT
The objective of this thesis is to examine the fit between the
globalization strategy and internationalization of R&D strategy of the
Japanese electronics firms. Chapter 1 summarizes previous academic works
on globalization strategy, and surveys the historical evolution and current
strategy of the Japanese electronics firms in the fields of globalization.
Chapter 2 focuses on the internationalization of R&D, introducing the studies
on the internationalization of R&D and the general status and strategy of
Japanese firms. Chapter 3 summarizes the findings from the structured
interviews. The features of the U.S. R&D centers of the Japanese electronics
firms are addressed in terms of two types of R&D facilities: corporate-level
laboratories and divisional-level laboratories. Based on the findings in
Chapter 3, the fit between the globalization strategy and internationalization
of R&D of the Japanese electronics firms is examined in Chapter 4. It is
argued that, while most common globalization strategy is to establish a locally
autonomous company in each region and the companies have been
rigorously creating elements of a value chain in the U.S., these elements are
disconnected. In Chapter 5, the transnational model is discussed as a solution
to bridge the discrepancy between the strategy and the current status.
However, except for the emphasis on the transnational mentality, the way to
become a transnational companies differs from company to company, and
even from unit to unit. Thus, managing the internationalization of R&D
will remain a challenge for Japanese electronics firms, even if they follow this
model.
Thesis Supervisor: D. Eleanor Westney
Title: Associate Professor of Management
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Introduction
Trading across borders has a long history. However, so-called
multinational companies -- companies which dispersed its activities as well
as resources across borders -- has emerged only in the twentieth century.
Following the U.S. and European large corporations by a decade or two,
Japanese firms started to join this stream of multinationals in the 1970s. In
the name of "globalization", the Japanese firms have been trying to gain from
this new challenge of moving value-creating factors.
This thesis examines the internationalization of R&D by Japanese
electronics firms. Geographically, the research is focused on the R&D centers
in the U.S. The topic was selected for three reasons. First, the
internationalization of Japanese firms in the U.S. is expected to be more
difficult than that of the European corporations, because of the wider gaps
created by geographic distance, language, culture, and management style
between the Japanese and Americans. Therefore, lessons from the Japanese
case has important implications for the companies from other non-Western
nations. Second, among globalized industries, the electronics industry is one
of those less affected by politics and government regulations. Although the
automobile industry is an important player in the internationalization of
R&D, it has been more influenced by the politics and the threat of regulation,
and thus less general in its implications for the corporate strategies. Third,
R&D is a primary source of long-term competitiveness for electronics firms.
Therefore, a corporation's ability to manage R&D has significant implications
in understanding a company's competitiveness.
This thesis, however, has some limitations. First, most of the R&D
centers we have interviewed have only a few years of history. Therefore, it
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might be too soon for us to evaluate their activities, although we believe we
allowed for this weakness by interviewing firms about the future direction of
R&D centers. Second, the number of the laboratories we could visit was
limited, but we did cover R&D centers of the main Japanese electronics
companies. Third, the amount of the information we obtained was not
standard across the case studies. Especially, in the divisional laboratory
category, information from Fujitsu Ltd. and Ricoh Co., Ltd. surpassed those
from the other companies.
L~LI_---------·-_1~ ~~
Chapter 1. Globalization of the Japanese Electronics Firms
In this chapter, the globalization strategy of the Japanese electronics
firms will be explored. First, general evolutionary patterns of globalization
and categorization of internationalized companies will be presented to give a
basis for the analysis. Then, the historical evolution and the current
globalization strategy of Japanese electronics firms will be analyzed.
1.1. Patterns of Globalization and Company Categorizations
1.1.1. Globalization and Internationalization
Before discussing the patterns of globalization and company
categorizations, I first would like to clarify the definitions of two
terminologies - those of globalization and internationalization. In this
thesis, these two words will simply mean "geographical dispersion of value-
adding activities into foreign countries," and will be used interchangeably. If
certain connotations are implied (e.g., Doz's "globalization" as centralization
or integration is contrasted with "fragmentation," and De Meyer and
Mizushima use "globalization" to mean dispersion), they will be explained in
that context.
1.1.2. Evolutionary Patterns of Globalization
International Product Life Cycle
One of the early studies on business globalization was conducted by
Vernon. Based on the pattern of the U.S. multinationals in the 1960s, he
introduced the "International Product Life Cycle." This model assumes that
the home country is technologically advanced, but that the factors required
for manufacturing are cheaper in the host country. The international product
life cycle consists of four steps. The first step is the development and sales of a
new product in the home country. As the product matures in the domestic
market, the firm starts to export it (Stage 2). Since local manufacturers in the
foreign market eventually learn how to produce this product, the original
producer starts to establish production facilities abroad to compete against
local manufacturers. In the final step, both foreign subsidiary and
competitors start exporting the product back to the U.S., taking advantage of
the lower prices made possible by the lower factor costs and scale economies.
Other Common Evolutionary Patterns of Globalization
In addition to Vernon's international product life cycle model, the
evolutionary level of business globalization is often measured by the portion
of the value chain that has been shifted abroad. One example of such models
is the categorization by Kikai Shinko Kyokai Keizai Kenkyusho (Economic
Research Institute of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Machine
Industry). They present four steps of business globalization. The first step is
the establishment of a sales function. The second step is the establishment of
a manufacturing function. The third step is the establishment of a R&D
function. The final step is to establish an autonomous regional headquarters,
which integrates all of the functions in the region.
Although these evolutionary models have been helpful in
understanding levels of globalization, some of the recent patterns of
globalization, especially those of Japanese firms, cannot be explained by these
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models. For example, contrary to Vernon's model, companies manufacture
locally even in the places where they cannot take advantage of lower costs
(e.g., production by Japanese companies in the U.S.). Another example is that
there are companies which establish R&D facilities without having a
production facility in an area (e.g., some R&D centers established in Europe by
Japanese firms). This violates the evolutionary pattern of the second model.
These exceptions suggests the limitations of these two models. The
most significant shortcomings of the international product life cycle lie in its
assumptions -- technological advantages in the home country and cost
advantages in the host country. The main shortcomings of the second model
lie in its assumptions that the organization in the host country follows the
same organizational evolution process as that of the parent company.
1.1.3. Categorization of Firms Operating Internationally
Given the limits of evolutionary models, there has been an endeavor
to understand firms operating internationally by categorizing them into
several different organizational patterns.
Categorization by Bartlett and Ghoshal
Bartlett and Ghoshal categorize firms operating internationally into
four categories. The first is a "multinational" company, whose organization
is decentralized and nationally self-sufficient. In this model, the role of the
overseas operation is to sense and exploit local opportunities. Knowledge is
developed and retained within each unit in this model. The second category
is a "global" company. This is a centralized organization, whose capabilities
are globally scaled. Overseas operations implement parent company
strategies, and knowledge is developed and retained at the center. The third
is an "international" company, some of whose sources of core competencies
are centralized but others decentralized. The role of overseas operations in
this model is to adapt and leverage parent company's competencies.
Knowledge is developed at the center and transferred to and applied in
overseas units. The last model is a "transnational" company, which has a
complex asset configuration -- some are centralized and some are
decentralized and all of them are integrated by strong interdependencies. The
distribution of assets and resources is best represented as an integrated
network. Unlike the other three models, the role of the overseas operation in
this model is not limited to local. Also, knowledge flows to and from all
locations. 1 (Exhibit 1-1: Multinational, Global, International, and
Transnational Companies)
1Bartlett and Ghoshal, Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution, (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 57-71.
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Exhibit 1-1: Organizational Characteristics of Multinational, Global,
International, and Transnational Models
Organizational Configuration of Role of overseas Development
Characteristics assets and operations and diffusion of
capabilities knowledge
Multinational Decentralized and Sensing and Knowledge
nationally self- exploiting local developed and
sufficient opportunities retained within
each unit
Global Centralized and Implementing Knowledge
globally scaled parent company developed and
strategies retained at the
center
International sources of core Adapting and Knowledge
competencies leveraging parent developed at the
centralized, company center and
others competencies transferred to
decentralized overseas units
Transnational Dispersed, Differentiated Knowledge
interdependent, contributions by developed jointly
and specialized national units to and shared
integrated worldwide
worldwide
operations
Source: Bartlett and Ghoshal, Managing Across Borders: The Transnational
Solution
13
Categorization by Imai
Imai categorizes firms into three categories. The first and second
categories of Imai, which are "multi-domestic" and "global," are similar to
Bartlett and Ghoshal's "multinational" and "global," respectively. Imai's
third category is called "cross border network". He defines it as an
organization which has the strengths of both "multi-domestic" and "global";
that is, each geographical unit is localized and yet exchanges information and
human resources. Moreover, these activities are coordinated throughout the
company. The most significant difference between this model and the global
model is that a cross border network is a self-reinforcing mechanism rather
than a centralized control mechanism. Imai attributes the necessity of such a
complicated organization to its responsiveness to uncertainty and instability
through diversity within an organization. 2
1.2. Historical Evolution of Globalization by Japanese Electronics Firms
1.2.1. Historical Evolution
The development of globalization of the Japanese electronics firms can
be broken down into four periods. The first period is one of export. In the
early 1960s, leading electronics firms started direct export. The second period
is the late 1960s and the early 1970s, when the Japanese electronics firms
established production facilities in other Asian countries in order to take
advantage of lower labor costs. The third period from the late 1970s to the
early 1980s was when the Japanese electronics firms expanded their overseas
2Imai, 21 Seiki-Gata Kigyo to Netto-wahku (21st Century Oriented Form of Firms and
Networking) (Tokyo: NTT Shuppan, 1992), 26-28.
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production in the more advanced countries. This evolutionary pattern is, as
discussed before, contrary to the pattern presented by Vernon. The factors
inducing such overseas production were increasing trade friction, especially
with the U.S., the introduction of floating exchange rate, and slower
economic growth in the domestic market. During the fourth period, from
1985 onward, trade friction became more fierce, and the rapid appreciation of
the yen after the Plaza Accord in 1985 hurt Japanese electronics firms with
high export ratios. To avoid political risks and exchange rate exposures, most
firms began to establish the entire value chain in each distinctive region --
America, Asia, and Europe.
1.2.2. Some Indicators of Globalization of the Japanese Firms
Level of Foreign Direct Investment
As a result of such ongoing globalization of business activities, Japan's
foreign direct investment increased dramatically from $12.2 billion in 1985 to
$73 billion in 1990. Currently, Japan is the third largest foreign direct investor
in the world based on the amount of outstanding direct investment,
following only the U.S. and the U.K. 3
Survey Conducted by Kikai Shinko Kyokai Keizai Kenkyusho
Kikai Shinko Kyokai Keizai Kenkyusho conducted a survey on the
globalization of the broadly-defined machinery industry in 1991. Although
the target of this survey includes not only electric and electronics
manufacturers but general machinery, transportation equipment, and
3JETRO, Handy Facts on U.S.-Japan Economic Relations, 13.
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precision instrument manufacturers, the survey helps us to understand the
level of internationalization quantitatively.
The overseas production ratio of the broadly-defined machinery
industry averaged at 10.9% in 1990, and is expected to increase to 15.5% in
1995. This number is higher than the average of all manufacturing
industries, which was 5.7% according to the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry. However, it is lower than those of the U.S. (24.9% in 1989) and
West Germany (16% in 1989) where multinational companies developed
earlier.
More than half of the electric/electronics firms have local managers in
foreign offices with the title of general manager or higher. Japanese
companies operating internationally admit the high turnover of their foreign
employees. They attribute high turnover to the following factors: (1) foreign
employees are excluded from informal network; (2) the rules for promotion
are ambiguous to foreign employees partly because of the differences in
appraisal systems; (3) foreign employees are not given the responsibility or
authority for making important decisions; and (4) there is discrimination
based on race and gender in Japanese firms.
With regard to decision making, about half of the company responded
that decisions related to sales, inventory, and materials/parts procurement
are made by foreign subsidiaries. However, local management is still strongly
dissatisfied with the small authority they have in making important
decisions. For example, equipment investment is still largely controlled by
headquarters in Japan (decision made mainly in Japan 31.8%; relatively more
in Japan, 22.3%). Problems in decision-making also occur in the area of R&D.
As for basic research, 76% answered that the final decision is mainly made in
16
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Japan; as for product development, 62.0%; product design, 55.9%; and process
technology development, 34.9%. 4
1.2.3. Local Responses to Japanese Investment
As Japanese foreign investment in the U.S. rose in the 1980s, especially
as Japanese firms began investing in landmark real estate and famous
companies in the U.S., resistance toward Japanese investment grew. One
result was introduction of the Exxon Florio Amendment, which was passed
in 1988 and which limits the acquisition of U.S. companies by foreigners if
that acquisition influences national security. After 1989, many of similar bills
have been submitted to Congress.
On the other hand, there are a group of people who recognize the
value of foreign investments in the U.S. Reich argues that the
competitiveness of a nation is defined by the competitiveness of the labor in
the nation, and that the ownership of a company and the birthplace of the
labor does not matter. He concludes that a U.S. firm conducting value-added
activities overseas contributes less to the competitiveness of the U.S. than a
foreign firm conducting value-added activities in the U.S. Thus,
protectionism affects U.S. competitiveness negatively. 5
1.3. Current Strategy
This section examines the current strategies of the Japanese firms first
in general and then on a company basis.
4Kikai Shinko Kyokai Keizai Kenkyusho, Nihon Kikai Sangyou no Globalization no Genjou to
Kadai (Globalization of Japanese Machinery Industry: Current Status and Perspectives), 1991,
12-16.
5Reich, Robert, "Who is Us?," Harvard Business Review (January-February 1990), 53-64.
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1.3.1. Establishing Regional Headquarters
As mentioned in 1.2.2., a central component of the current strategy of
most Japanese electronics firms is to establish regional headquarters.
According to the survey conducted by Kikai Shinko Kyokai Keizai
Kenkyusho, 25.9% of the respondents answered that they have already
established regional headquarters, and 29.3%, that they plan to have one in
the future. This trend is more obvious among large scale companies: among
25 firms with capital of V10 billion or more, seven have already established
regional headquarters and eight answered that they will in the future.
However, the (expected) role of these regional headquarters is far from
the traditional meaning of "headquarters". Despite the fact that the Japanese
firms' strategy statements often emphasize the importance of independent,
self-sufficient local operations integrated under regional headquarters, the
(expected) role of the regional headquarters is mere administrative assistance
or coordination of the local operations. The five most-supported (expected)
role of the regional headquarters are: (1) to process problems common to the
operations in that area (indicated by 56.3% of those who have or plan to have
regional headquarters); (2) to support local operations in the area of finance
(50.0%); (3) to adjust activities of different operating units in the area (43.8%);
(5) to localize management (40.6%). To have an entire integrated value chain
-- to develop, manufacture, sell, finance, hire autonomously -- was not rated
high: it was mentioned by only 15.6%.6
6Kikai Shinko Kyokai Keizai Kenkyusho, Nihon Kikai Sangyou no Globalization no Genjou to
Kadai (Globalization of Japanese Machinery Industry: Current Status and Perspectives), 16-19.
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1.3.2. Strategy of Individual Companies
The globalization strategies of Japanese electronics firms can be
separated into four different categories, according to the type of organization
the companies are attempting to create. The first category is the "locally
autonomous," emphasizing the establishment of autonomous and self-
sufficient local operations under a regional headquarters. The second
category is a "mesh" or "matrix," which localizes operations and, at the same
time, links operations by business unit and/or functions. The third category
is "transnational," aiming to become a transnational company as defined by
Bartlett and Ghoshal. The last category is "other."
Although the globalization strategies of Japanese electronics firms are
categorized into four types, the idea of establishing regional headquarters and
somehow integrating operations in each region is a common immediate goal
for both "locally autonomous" and "mesh" strategies.
Locally Autonomous
The most common type of globalization strategy of Japanese firms is
this category. Four out of eight companies we surveyed are in this category.
They are Canon Inc., Hitachi, Ltd., Ricoh Co., Ltd., and Sony Corporation.
Canon: For more than a decade, Canon has been expanding its overseas
activities by establishing subsidiaries that undertake production and
marketing abroad. For example, Canon set up Canon Inc., Taiwan, in 1971 to
make cameras; and Canon Business Machines, Inc., in 1974 in the U.S.
19
The ultimate goal of Canon's globalization strategy is to attain the
status of "global corporation," which was defined by President Kaku as
follows;
"(A global corporation may be defined as one that) has no national identity
and thus generates no international friction. It is a corporation that
establishes subsidiaries in countries around the world according to local
needs. Fully integrated, these independent entities conduct research and
development activities and engage in manufacturing and marketing. Such a
corporation creates meaningful employment and does not discriminate on
the basis of nationality; all employees work together as members of the same
worldwide effort. By paying taxes on locally earned profits and reinvesting
capital in host countries, these global corporations contribute to financial
stability and export growth. They also endeavor to exist in harmony with
their respective communities.7 '"
To attain this goal, Canon started a five-year Global Corporation Plan
in 1988.
Hitachi: The company emphasizes contribution to the community. The
company has been trying to attain this goal by establishing the whole value
chain integrated under regional headquarters in each region.8 One such
example is the reorganization of their operations in the U.S. in April 1987.
7Canon Inc., corporate brochure, Toward A Global Corporation, 6-7.
8Kikai Shinko Kyokai Keizai Kenkyusho, Keiei no Guroubaru-ka to Kenkyuukaihatsu
Senryaku: R&D Kinou no Kokusai-teki Tenkai (Globalization of Management and R&D
Strategy), 1990, 54.
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They consolidated their five major manufacturing subsidiaries in the U.S.
under the management of Hitachi America, Ltd. to enhance local autonomy.
Ricoh: Ricoh describes its ultimate goal of a globalization as a"unified,
separate Ricoh" in its 1987 Annual Report. In the President's letter to
shareholders in the 1989 Annual Report, he stated that:
"I am convinced that the creation of independent operations abroad --
to plan, procure, manufacture and market out products locally -- is the key to
long-term international success."
In order to achieve the above goal, Ricoh is trying to transform itself
into an organization with three independent and at the same time,
complementary headquarters, in Asia, Europe, and the U.S.
Sony: In its 1991 Annual Report, Sony states that one of the company's five
medium to long-term policies is to bring all facets of its overseas operations,
including procurement of components, R&D, production, and marketing, in
closer contact with local communities. Chairman Morita describes this in a
phrase "Global Localization."
Mesh or Matrix Type
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. and Toshiba Corporation fall
into this category.
Matsushita: Like the companies in the first category, in its corporate
brochures, Matsushita also emphasizes having whole value chain managed
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under regional headquarters in each region. However, in Matsushita's case,
the persistent base for its operations is business units, and the resulting
organization will take the form of a matrix. At Matsushita, each business
unit is responsible for planning and operating both domestic and foreign
activities, while regional headquarters coordinates its operations within the
region and takes care of public relations.9
Currently, Matsushita manages 117 subsidiary companies outside Japan
through three regional headquarters: Matsushita Electric Corporation of
America (established in 1988); Panasonic Europe in U.K. (1988), and Asia
Matsushita Electric in Singapore (1990).1 0
Toshiba: Currently, Toshiba is making efforts to create a matrix organization
by establishing the whole value chain, integrated by the regional
headquarters, in each region while continuing to keep the horizontal
network with functional departments at headquarters in Japan. To maintain
the horizontal network, Toshiba plans to use the division of labor by theme
in each area. 11 Its efforts to attain division of labor might allow Toshiba to be
categorized as a transnational type. However, because it still lacks
"autonomous" interdependence, I categorized the company as a mesh type.
Transnational Type
NEC Corporation falls into this category.
9Imai, 21 Seiki-Gata Kigyo to Netto-wahku (21st Century Oriented Form of Firms and
Networking), (Tokyo: NTT Shuppan, 1992), 133.
10Sakamoto,Global R&D Management in the Electronics Industry: A Comparative Study
between U.S. and Japanese Multinationals., (MIT Sloan School of Management Thesis), 1991,
68-69.
11Kikai Shinko Kyokai Keizai Kenkyusho, Keiei no Guroubaru-ka to Kenkyuukaihatsu
Senryaku: R&D Kinou no Kokusai-teki Tenkai (Globalization of Management and R&D
Strategy), 1990, 49-50.
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NEC: The current globalization strategy of NEC is called "Mesh
Globalization". However, it is actually a transnational type of strategy because
of its emphasis on interdependence among its operational units. In this
strategy, NEC is trying to localize its operations and, at the same time, tries to
decrease the control by the headquarters in Japan and increase the autonomy
of local operations. Through each operation's autonomous efforts to
maximize cost-efficiency and productivity, the company expects its worldwide
operations to develop into a closely linked network. 12
Other
Because Fujitsu Ltd. does not mention an ideal type of organization in
its global strategy, Fujitsu was categorized as other.
Fujitsu: Globalization is one of the five pillars of Fujitsu's business (the
other four are total solution to customers' needs, downsizing, networking,
and innovations). 13 In its efforts towards globalization, Fujitsu emphasizes
"Existing and Prospering Together" and "Cross Culture". The concept of cross
culture means to respect the local culture. One example is the management
of ICL in the UK, an acquired company which is completely continued in a
British way.
These internationalization strategies of the Japanese electronics firms
are expected to have a strong influence on the internationalization of R&D,
which will be closely examined in the following chapters.
12Imai, 21 Seiki-Gata Kigyo to Netto-wahku (21st Century Oriented Form of Firms and
Networking), (Tokyo: NTT Shuppan, 1992),138.
13Fujitsu News, April 1991, 3.
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Chapter 2: Strategy of R&D Internationalization by the Japanese Electronics
Firms
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 will focus on the internationalization of R&D by
Japanese firms. There are two reasons why internationalization of R&D is of
importance. Firstly, given that establishing a whole value chain integrated
under regional headquarters is an immediate goal, the internationalization of
R&D is an unavoidable step for the Japanese electronics firms. Secondly, one
of the most important sources of competitiveness in the electronics industry
is technology. Therefore, a company's ability to integrate R&D strategy with
overall globalization strategy will make a significant difference in the
company's performance in the long run.
In this chapter, we first look at previous academic work to provide a
basic framework for analysis. Then, the case of Japanese electronics firms in
general will be discussed to provide background for the following chapters.
2.1. Previous Academic Works On Internationalization of R&D
2.1.1. Types of R&D Centers and Evolutionary Patterns
Categorization by Rondstadt
The role of R&D centers abroad is not always the same. Based on the
early study of internationalization of R&D in the 1970s, Rondstadt describes
four types of international R&D activities. The international product life
cycle is the basic assumption for his model.
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(1) Transfer Technology Units (TTU)
Units established to help certain foreign subsidiaries transfer
manufacturing technology from the parent while also providing
related technical services for foreign customers.
(2) Indigenous Technology Units (ITU)
Units established to develop new and improved products expressly for
foreign markets. These products were not the direct result of new
technology supplied by the parent organizations.
(3) Global Technology Units(GTU)
Units established to develop new products and processes for worldwide
production and simultaneous application in the company's major
world markets.
(4) Corporate Technology Units (CTU)
Units established to generate new technology of a long-term or
exploratory nature expressly for the parent.
Rondstadt found that the U.S. companies he studied had started
foreign R&D activities in all four categories, however, most began as TTUs or
ITUs and followed the evolutionary pattern, from TTU through ITU to
GTU. 14
Categorization by Nemoto
Nemoto categorizes R&D centers into five groups along two
dimensions -- the level of market orientation versus technology orientation
14 Rondstadt, Research and Development Abroad by U.S. Multinationals, (New York: New
York Publishers, 1977).
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I"--- and the level of independence versus integration. The market-oriented R&D
centers focus on the modifications and development of the products which
meet market needs, while the technology-oriented R&D centers focus on
obtaining superior technology. Nemoto's categorization are as follows.
(1) Local Technical Center (LT)
This type of R&D center is responsible for modification of products to
meet local market needs. Its linkage with a home country headquarters
is strong but that with other R&D facilities in the area is weak. This is
equivalent to a technology transfer unit by Rondstadt's definition.
(2) Product Development Center (PD)
This type of R&D center develops products to fit specific market needs.
(3) Technology Development Center (TD)
This type of R&D center focuses on utilizing technological resources in
a region to develop new technologies and new products. These R&D
centers are very independent. This type was not included in
Rondstadt's categorization.
(4) Global Technology Research Center (GT)
Like a technology development center, this type of R&D center also
focuses on acquiring technologies. However, the difference is that this
type of R&D center not only focuses on local markets but also plays an
assigned role in the company's worldwide R&D activities. Therefore,
this type of R&D center communicates more often with other R&D
centers.
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(5) Global R&D Network
Integrated R&D activities are conducted under a global network. He
categorizes IBM, which was categorized by Rondstadt as a GPU, in this
group.
Although Rondstadt showed the single evolution model of R&D
centers, which is TTUs-ITTs-GPUs, Nemoto argues that R&D centers can
evolve in two ways; LT-PD-GP or LT-TD-GT. 15
Doubts About Evolutionary Models
Although both Rondstadt and Nemoto suggested evolutionary models
of R&D centers, there are some questions about these models. For example,
De Meyer and Mizushima argue that globalization of competition has
brought some doubts about the validity of Rondstadt's evolutionary model.
In recent years, foreign laboratories with new product responsibilities (GTUs)
including exploratory research (CTUs) are more likely to be established
through direct placement as the result of global strategic decision-making by
the parent companies rather than evolution of their existing foreign R&D
activities. 16
Also, the complexity of the factors influencing internationalization of
R&D, which has been increasingly observed in recent years, is not acounted
for in the evolutionary model.
15Nemoto, Guroubaru Gijutsu Senryaku-ron (A Study of Strategy of Global Technology), (Tokyo:
Doubunkan, 1990), 38-43.
16 De Meyer and Mizushima, "Global R&D Management," R&D Management, Vol. 19, No.2,
1989, 135-146.
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2.1.2. Factors Influencing Internationalization of R&D
Although the internationalization of R&D is an unavoidable step to
achieve their globalization strategy, that is not convincing enough to explain
these firms' decision to internationalize R&D. The factors influencing the
internationalization of R&D can be identified as follows.
Doz points out the three key forces driving toward decentralization or
internationalization of R&D. They are: (1) the dispersion of lead users
around the world, (2) the dispersion of scientists around the world, and (3)
the host country's government's desire for more highly skilled jobs through
the location of R&D. The third factor can also make a firm eligible for
national R&D subsidies or provide access to national collaborative projects.
He also argues that the forces driving centralization of R&D in the
home country is strong because (1) the needs for specific local product
adaptation is lessened as the world market becomes increasingly
homogeneous, (2) the benefits for having researchers in close proximity to
one another are greater, (3) there are often economies of scope in R&D, and
(4) home countries are unwilling to be dependent on technologies developed
abroad because of political risks.
Reasons (2) and (3) are often mentioned as the main reason for R&D
centers to maintain "critical mass." In companies that require research by
multi-disciplinary teams, it is said that at least 50-100 employees are needed to
reach an efficient scale. 17
17Perrino and Tipping, "Global management of Technology," Research Technology Management
May-June (1989), 12-19.
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Doz's conclusion is that there will be many trade-offs between
centralization and decentralization, and which factors prevail will be
dependent on types of function, country, and business. 18
Westney points out eight factors influencing globalization of R&D.
They are:
(1) The Science/Technology Factor
(a) Equilibrium of the scientific/technological level between
industrialized societies
(b) Complementary strength of nations in science/technology
(2) The Nation/Regional Factor
(a) Setting standards - national and international standards
(b) Access to national R&D subsidy
(3) The Market Factor
(a) Global dispersion of lead users
(b) Customization of products for national markets
(4) The Competition factor
(a) Global distribution of major competitors
(b) Improving the company image through full commitment to the
national market. 19
18
"International Industries: Fragmentation Versus Globalization." In: B.R. Guile and H.
Brooks (eds.), Technology and Global Industry: Companies and Nations in the World Economy,
(Washington DC: National Academu Press, 1987).
19 Westney, "The Globalization of Technology and the Internationalization of R&D," Business
Review, Vol. 37, No.2, 1990, 30-40.
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Another explanation on internationalization of R&D is provided by
Nemoto (1990). He identifies six costs and eight benefit of overseas R&D
activities. 20
Costs:
(1) Initial investment for establishment of a R&D center
(2) Duplication of investment
(3) Communications costs (Includes culture and language gaps)
(4) Duplication of projects
(5) Linkage of technology
(6) PR costs
Benefits:
(1) Faster access to technology trends
(2) Better understanding of local market's needs
(3) Access to local R&D networks
(4) Exposure to new ideas and concepts
(5) Faster development of products for local and/or global markets
(6) R&D activities which cannot be done in Japan (due to legal restrictions;
language-related researches)
(7) Exposure to world-class researchers
(8) Accumulation of R&D management know-how.
20Nemoto, Guroubaru Gijutsu Senryaku-ron (A Study of Strategy of Global Technology), (Tokyo:
Doubunkan, 1990), 84-86.
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2.1.3. Types of R&D Strategy
Once a firm decides to internationalize its R&D activities, there are
different strategies it can pursue. Westney describes three different types of
global R&D strategy. They are:
(1) enhanced global research for foreign technology,
(2) cooperation with foreign companies through strategic alliance, and
(3) internationalization of R&D functions.
She suggests that internationalization of R&D is the final stage of a
global R&D strategy to cope with globalization of technology. 2 1
2.1.4. Central, Local, and Transnational Innovation
Bartlett and Ghoshal describes four different types of innovations,
which influences a corporation's R&D strategy. These four types correspond
to multinational, global, international, and transnational corporations
discussed in the previous chapter.
Global and international companies have depended on a central
process for creating and exploiting innovations: sensing a new opportunity in
the home country, using the centralized development resources of the parent
company to create a new product or process, and then adopting the
innovation in appropriate locations around the world. The risk of central
innovation is market insensitivity.
On the other hand, multinational companies relied heavily on local
innovations: their autonomous, self-contained national subsidiaries used
21 Westney, "The Globalization of Technology and the Internationalization of R&D," Business
Review, Vol. 37, No.2, 1990, 30-40.
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their own resources to create new products or processes that meet the needs of
their local environments. The risk of local innovation is needless
differentiation.
In the transnational model, knowledge is developed jointly and shared
worldwide. In this model, centrally designed products and processes still play
an important global role. But innovations are created by the subsidiaries as
well. The transnational will pool the resources of central facilities and many
national subsidiaries to develop a worldwide solution for its dispersed
organization. The risk of locally leveraged innovations is NIH (not invented
here) risk, and that of globally linked innovation is coordination cost. 22
2.2. Case of the Japanese Firms
This section explores the Japanese firms' progress in
internationalization of R&D to date. Internationalization of R&D by the
Japanese firms, in fact, started only in the late 1980s, led by the electronics
firms. In 1987, Hitachi, Fujitsu, NEC, Sony, and Ricoh established overseas
R&D centers, and Matsushita followed in 1988.23
2.2.1. Current Status
The JETRO survey on Japanese R&D in the U.S. (139 Electric and
electronic manufacturers replied) shows that 43.9% of them have some form
of R&D function in the U.S.: 5.0% of the 139 companies have joint R&D
programs, and 7.9% have independent R&D firms. 24
22Bartlett and Ghoshal, Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution, (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 64.
23Kikai Shinko Kyokai Keizai Kenkyusho, Keiei no Guroubaru-ka to Kenkyuukaihatsu
Senryaku: R&D Kinou no Kokusai-teki Tenkai (Globalization of Management and R&D
Strategy), 1990, 44.
24JETRO, JETRO Survey 1990.
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1Other surveys shows that about 10% of the large scale Japanese firms
have overseas R&D facilities. According to a survey by the Science and
Technology Agency of Japan in 1989, 9.7% of Japanese firms with the capital of
V10 billion or larger (including all industries) have already established R&D
centers abroad. 25 Another survey by the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry shows that 11% or fewer Japanese firms with foreign
subsidiaries/affiliates with 10% or larger ownership in all industries have
established R&D centers abroad 26.
The MITI survey shows that 37.8% of the 119 Japanese firms' overseas
R&D centers were located in the United States, followed by 36.1% in Asia,
13.4% in the EC, and 12.7% elsewhere. Based on R&D expenditures, the U.S.
share surges to 49.0% of the V57.7 billion total, followed by 28.9% in the EC,
17.6% in Asia, and 4.5% elsewhere. This difference in shares based on the
number of R&D centers and R&D expenditures suggests that R&D centers in
Asian countries include many technical service centers which support
marketing, and modification centers attached to manufacturing facilities
while R&D centers in the U.S. and EC are more focused on higher value-
added research and development activities. This corresponds to the result of
MITI survey which shows that most the overseas basic and applied research
centers and new product development centers are located in the U.S. (Exhibit
2-1: Overseas R&D Centers of the Japanese Firms)
25 Science and Technology Agency of Japan, Minkan-kigyo no Kenkyu-katsudo ni Kansuru Chosa
(Heisei Gan-nen Do), (Research on R&D Activities by the Private Entities: 1989 Edition), 1989.
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25SineadTechnology Agency of Japan 18, Minan-igof Jpnos Kenyurasud nith Kaiansr hosa
(He isei Gnnn o), (Rsa chr oildng D Aciinutries b thae Private Eties: 1989 Edito) 198
26tr bod.5Aohrsuvyb h Ministry of International Trade and dsrDiSnKiKia oh oe oa,(h
Thr Srey on ForeinIve sostmet). 78 fte 1 aaeefim'oes
Exhibit 2-1: Overseas R&D Centers of the Japanese Firms
By region
No. of R&D centers
(119 in total)
R&D spendings
(V57.7 billion in total)
By industry
No. of R&D centers
(119 in total)
R&D spendings
(V57.7 billion in total)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100%
U.S. E.C. Asia Other37.8 13.4 36.1 1 2.7
49.0 28.9 17.6
Transportation Other Other
Equipment machinery manufacturing
Chemical Electric Other industries
49.0 16.8 5. 13.5 23.5 26.1
7.3 24.8 27.6 8.8 7.7 23.8 10 )%
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Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Dai San Kai Kaigai Toshi Tokei Soran
(The Third Survey on Overseas Investment)
By industry, electric/electronics equipment manufacturers account for
16.8% of the total number of R&D centers, followed by 15.1% for chemical
product manufacturers, and 5.0% for transportation equipment
manufacturers. Based on R&D expenditures, transportation equipment
manufacturers are first with 27.6%, followed by 24.8% for electric/electronics
equipment manufacturers, and 7.3% for chemical product manufacturers.
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2.2.2. Factors Inducing Internationalization of R&D
The purpose for establishing overseas R&D facilities changes over
time. According to a survey conducted by the Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyujo
(Policy Science Research Center), the main purposes at the time of the
establishment of R&D centers are "to strengthen technologies" and "to
support production and marketing" (Exhibit 2-2: Reasons to have Overseas
R&D Centers at the Establishment and in the Future).27 As in Exhibit 2-3, "to
collect advanced overseas R&D information" (indicated by 13.8% of the
respondents) is recognized as the most important reason at the establishment,
followed by "to enhance product development based on overseas technology"
(10.8%), "to learn superior technologies and knowledge" (9.2%), "to catch up
to the top competitors" (6.9%), and "to techologically respond to competitors"
(6.7%). A second important group of reasons are related to the support of
other facilities in the region. Included in this category are: "to technically
facilities in the region. Included in this category are: "to technically support
facilities in the region. Included in this category are: "to technically support
overseas production facilities" (5.5%), and "to respond to local market's
needs" (5.3%).
As to the future role of these R&D centers, science/technology factors
become much less important while support of local operations increases in
importance. Also, the relaxation of trade and technology friction and access to
an excellent labor force drastically increases in importance. This shift can be
confirmed by the changes in the rate in Exhibit 2-3. "To collect advanced
overseas R&D information", the top reason to establish overseas R&D,
dropped its ratio most drastically by 7.8% points from 13.8% to 6.0%. The first
2 7Kikai Shinko Kyokai Keizai Kenkyusho, Keiei no Guroubaru-ka to Kenkyuukaihatsu
Senryaku: R&D Kinou no Kokusai-teki Tenkai (Globalization of Management and R&D
Strategy), 1990, 22-26.
Exhibit 2-3: Reasons to Have Overseas R&D Centers at the Establishment and
in the Future
(%)
Reasons At In the future Changes in %
establishment points
<Strengthen technologies>
-Enhance product development based
on overseas technology 10.8 7.7 -3.1
-Learn superior technologies and
knowledge 9.2 2.4 -6.8
-Catch up to the top competitors 6.9 2.4 -4.5
-Technologically respond to
competitors 6.7 5.4 -1.3
-To have an access to top-level 4.5 7.5 +3.0
foreign researchers
-Conduct R&D under the free
atmosphere in foreign labs 3.1 5.5 +2.4
-Activate domestic R&D by opening
labs overseas 3.9 4.2 +0.3
-Shorten R&D period by utilizing
overseas R&D resources 3.7 5.4 +1.7
-Reduce R&D investment by
diversifying the risk 2.2 2.2 0.0
-Reduce R&D costs by conducting
R&D abroad 1.2 1.3 +0.1
<Collect advanced overseas R&D
information> 13.8 6.0 -7.8
<Support production and marketing>
-Technical support to overseas
production facilities 5.5 6.3 +0.8
-Strategic necessity in medium-/long-
term 2.6 6.6 +4.0
-Respond to local market's needs 5.3 7.3 +2.0
-Strengthen globalized strategy 4.1 9.1 +5.0
<Others>
-Supplement weak/new areas at HQ 5.1 6.1 +1.0
-Legislative and other restrictions
forcing the establishment of R&D 4.5 5.1 +0.6
-Improve company's trust and image
as a internationalized company 3.3 4.0 +0.7
-Request from foreign countries 2.0 0.2 -1.8
-Respond to international
trade / technolog ica l conflicts 0.1 4.2 +4.1
-Others 0.0 0.1 +0.1
Source: Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyujo. Arranged by the author.
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four reasons in the category of "to strengthen technologies" also decreased
their ratios. On the other hand, all of the four reasons in the category of "to
support production and marketing" increased their ratios. Of the four, the
most outstanding growth was shown in "strengthen globalized strategy",
which gained 5.0% points from 4.1% to 9.1%, followed by "strategic necessity
in medium to long-term", which increased by 4.0% points from 2.6% to 6.6%.
"To respond to international trade/technological conflicts" increased its ratio
by 4.1% points from almost nothing (0.1%) to 4.2%, and "to have an access to
top-level foreign researchers" increased by 3.0% points from 4.5% to 7.5%.
A study by Kikai Shinko Kyokai Keizai Kenkyusho summarizes the
factors inducing overseas R&D in the electronics firms as follows: (1) to
support production facilities in the region, (2) to design products responsive
to the market's needs, (3) to develop products which satisfies
national/regional standards (i.e., HDTV), (4) to look for scarce engineers (i.e.,
software engineers) (5) to reduce technological friction, and (6) to pursue
strategic alliance with foreign firms.28
As these surveys indicate, one of the increasingly important factors
inducing the internationalization of R&D is to avoid technology friction.
According to Science and Technology White Paper (1991), the Japanese trade
balance for technology in 1988 is such that technology exports totaled $1,785
million and technology imports amounted to $2,263 million. Imports come
mostly from the United States and Europe, and the U.S. has about one half of
these. The share of the U.S. increased form 57% in 1984 to 60% in 1988. The
28Kikai Shinko Kyokai Keizai Kenkyusho, Keiei no Guroubaru-ka to Kenkyuukaihatsu
Senryaku: R&D Kinou no Kokusai-teki Tenkai (Globalization of Management and R&D
Strategy), 1990, 44-45.
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items of technology which are imported are concentrated in the field of
electronics. 29
2.2.3. Reactions in the Host Country
There have been both negative and positive reactions to the Japanese
companies' establishing R&D centers abroad. An example of positive
reaction is the argument by Reich, which was discussed in the previous
chapter. An example of negative reactions is the argument by Clyde
Prestowitz, a former U.S. trade negotiator for Washington. He argues that
stronger Japanese research capabilities will continue to erode the competitive
position of Corporate America by enabling Japan to tap into new technology
at the earliest stages. He anticipates that the Japanese companies can put
more resources into commercialization since they feel less pressure to show
short-term profits as compared to U.S. firms. Therefore, he concludes that
likely the new technologies that come out of the lab will benefit the Japanese
first.30
29Science and Technology Agency of Japan, Science and Technology White Paper. (1991)
30 ., "Follow That Brain Wave; Avid for new ideas and short of engineers, the
Japanese are moving their R and D labs to the U.S.", Time, August 12, 1991, 48.
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Chapter 3: Data Analysis
This chapter summarizes the results of the structured interviews
conducted by the structured thesis members. The structured thesis group
visited 20 R&D centers of eight Japanese electronics firms, namely, Canon,
Fujitsu, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, NEC, Ricoh, Sony, and Toshiba.
3.1. Definition of Corporate and Divisional Laboratories
In this chapter, interview findings will be summarized in two different
groups, corporate laboratories and divisional laboratories. Such grouping is
adopted to match distinctions in the nature of different laboratories:
although the definition of corporate laboratories and divisional laboratories
varies by company, corporate laboratories are usually involved in more basic
research with a target of five years or longer while divisional laboratories are
involved in research closer to commercialization (e.g., product development)
with a target of five years or fewer. In addition to these two types of
laboratories, engineering centers are often categorized as R&D centers.
Engineering centers are usually attached to manufacturing facilities and are
involved in modification of products. Thus, their targets are usually less
than one year. In our structured interviews, we did not have a chance to
interview at engineering centers.
When categorizing laboratories, we basically followed the definition
provided by the company. Whenever the definition was not provided by the
company, we categorized laboratories based on the level of corporate
organization it belonged to; that is, a laboratory will be categorized as a
corporate laboratory unless it belongs to a business unit (e.g. divisions and
regional headquarters).
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3.2. Corporate Laboratories
The structured thesis group members interviewed six corporate
laboratories of Japanese electronics firms in the U.S. They are:
Canon Research Center America, Inc.,
Ricoh California Research Center,
Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratory,
NEC Research Institute, Inc.,
Advanced Computer Architecture Laboratory (Sony), and
New Jersey Telecommunications Laboratory (Sony).
In addition, some information on Matsushita's Panasonic
Technologies, Inc. was available.
Establishment
The six laboratories at which we had interviews are all relatively new
with only a few years of operation. The oldest is the NEC Research Institute
which was established in 1989, followed by Canon Research Center America,
Ricoh California Research Center and Sony's New Jersey
Telecommunications Laboratory which were established in 1990. The newest
are Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratory and Sony's Advanced Computer
Architecture Laboratory which were established in 1991.
Size
All six laboratories, except the NEC Research Institute, are still small,
and far from achieving critical mass. The only laboratory to have achieved
the critical mass, NEC Research Institute, currently has 50 full time scientists
and plans to staff a total of 60. The size of the other laboratories are (from
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smallest to largest): Sony's Advanced Computer Architecture Laboratory has
2, Sony's New Jersey Telecommunications Laboratory (5), Mitsubishi's MERL
(10), and Ricoh California Research Center (16). The exact number of the
researchers at Canon Research Center America was not available, though it is
known that the size of the laboratory has not reached critical mass. (Exhibit 3-
1: Interview Summary - Corporate-level Laboratories)
Efforts to achieve critical mass have been ongoing. Firstly,
almost all of the R&D centers are planning to expand staffing levels. Canon
Research Center America plans to expand the staffing of its technical
professionals to 25 in the near future; Mitsubishi's MERL plans to hire 25
people by the end of 1992 and 50 people over the next five years. Another
approach is to locate different R&D centers close to one another. For example,
Ricoh moved its formerly dispersed R&D centers to the Silicon Valley to
have a total number of researchers of about 200 at the establishment of Ricoh
California Research Center.
Funding
All of these laboratories are funded by the headquarters in Japan, and
no facility receives funds from local operations. This is because these
laboratories are "corporate laboratories" and belong directly to the
headquarters in Japan on organizational charts. For example, the NEC
Research Institute is funded fully with corporate basic research funds, and
Sony's New Jersey Telecommunications Laboratory is fully funded by
corporate R&D in Japan.
However, local managers have influence on the budgeting processes.
Ricoh California Research Center is funded by Japan, but local managers have
41
Exhibit 3-1: Interview Summary - Corporate-level Laboratories
Company/Laboratory Size Funding Mandate Manage- Communications Communications External
ment with home with local Technology
style country operations Links
Canon:
Canon Research Center America, Inc. <50 Corporate Basic US Loose Loose Stanford
Matsushita:
Panasonic Technologies, Inc. <50 Corporate Basic US Loose Not available
Mitsubishi:
Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratory <50 Corporate Basic US Loose Loose
NEC:
NEC Research Institute, Inc. <50 Corporate Basic US Loose Loose Bell Lab.
Ricoh:
California Research Center <50 Corporate Applied US Dense Loose
Sony:
Advanced Computer Architecture Laboratory <50 Corporate Dev. US Not available Not available
New Jersey Telecommunications Laboratory <50 Corporate Dev. US Not available Not available
Notes: Dev. stands for product development.
Sources: Interviews and publicly available information.
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significant amounts of discretion and responsibility in guiding the work of
the laboratory.
Mandate
There are two important elements in terms of mandates. One aspect is
how much freedom local laboratories have to define their mandates, and the
other is the content of the mandate itself.
As for the freedom given to the local laboratories to define the
mandate, there are four patterns. The first is that the mandate of the
laboratory was already narrowly set by headquarters at the time of
establishment. The second is that the headquarters define the mission of the
laboratories very broadly, and the local management plans more detailed
research topics. The third is that headquarters in Japan and local
management jointly select the research topics. The last pattern is that the
local management is totally responsible for selecting the mandate of the
laboratory.
Sony's two laboratories seem to fall into the first category. They are
given very specific mandates compared to the other corporate laboratories;
namely, software development for specific products.
Included in the second category are Mitsubishi's MERL, and NEC
Research Institute. At MERL, the broader theme of research, which is "basic
research on computers," has been set by the headquarters in Japan. However,
the local director, who had directed software engineering at IBM's Watson
Research Institute for over 20 years, is given full authority over the research
management. At NEC Research Institute, the area of focus -- technology for
unconventional computing environments -- was selected by the headquarters
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in Japan. However, as long as the research topics stay within the larger
framework, topic selection is autonomous.
Ricoh California Research Center falls into the third category. At this
laboratory, projects comes both from within the California Research Center
and the Research and Development Center in Yokohama, Japan.
Included in the last pattern is Canon. Before specific goals and
strategies were formulated, the globalization of R&D was decided according to
Canon's globalization program. Therefore, it was the local management who
was given the responsibility for selecting the research focus and goals for the
center. Although the local managers need to report to the headquarters in
Japan, the local management has felt a reasonably complete sense of
autonomy in defining the strategic goals and the organizational structure for
the center. To date, Canon headquarters has not directed that any specific
projects be undertaken at the center.
As far as the contents of the research is concerned, it varies from very
basic research to product development. However, even the most product
development-oriented laboratories are more inclined toward basic research
than the offshore divisional laboratories of their own companies. Among the
six laboratories discussed here, NEC Research Institute seems to be at the
extreme end of the basic-product development continuum, followed by
Mitsubishi's MERL and Canon Research Center America. Relatively closer to
the product development side are Ricoh California Research Center and
Sony's two laboratories. (Exhibit 3-2: Mandate of Corporate Laboratories)
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Level of autonomy
High
Canon
NEC
Mitsubishi
Research Area Basic
Ricoh
Sony
Low
Source: Created by the author
In addition to the scientific/technological mandate in their respective
areas of research, some of these laboratories serve headquarters as a place to
learn American style R&D management. For example, Ricoh has been
consciously making efforts to learn from its R&D centers in the U.S. about
how to realize a more creative environment for its researchers. One of the
resulting changes in its R&D centers in Japan is less emphasis on the seniority
system. Also, the director of the Canon Research Center America states that:
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Product
Development
Exhibit 3-2: Mandate of Corporate Laboratories
"Canon is best served by tapping into the American model of R&D rather
than using the Japanese cultural and management approach in the U.S. The
U.S. model offers Canon something different and unique which might be
rendered ineffective by attempts to import Japanese management practices."
Management Style
All of the six laboratories have adopted American style management.
In other words, at all six facilities, there have been no attempts to introduce
typical Japanese style management, such as life time employment, or the
seniority system. Also, recruiting and compensation plans are done in the
American style. This is a natural consequence, considering that most of the
laboratories have U.S. citizens as managers, and almost all of the researchers
at these facilities are U.S. citizens. For example, the NEC Research Institute
has no Japanese researchers. The Canon Research Center America and the
Ricoh California Research Center have only one Japanese each. In addition, if
one of the mandates of the laboratory is to give headquarters in Japan a
chance to learn about the American style R&D management as mentioned,
headquarters in Japan might make efforts consciously not to intervene in its
R&D centers in the U.S.
Communications with Home Country
These facilities' communications with operations in Japan are
characterized by the interviewers to be loose with the one exception of Ricoh.
In the case of the Canon Research Center America, the only Japanese
employee serves as the interface between the center and Japan. The center
sends monthly and semi-annual reports to Japan and conducts informational
meetings with the operating divisions to share information about research
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projects and results. Also, the center depends on headquarters for patent
strategy and legal support. In the case of the NEC Research Institute, the
majority of communication is with divisions in Japan. There is little formal
linkage with the Japanese based R&D organizations. Communications
through electronics mail is most common. Also, communications with
business managers are done through "R&D exhibits," where heads of the
business units and the technology sponsors gather to discuss R&D needs. In
the case of Sony, the project conducted by the Advanced Computer
Architecture Laboratory is not directly linked to a project in Japan. Thus, the
need for communication is not so strong. The project conducted by Sony's
New Jersey Telecommunications Laboratory is more related to a prototype
development project in Japan. Thus, the need for communication with Japan
is relatively stronger.
Ricoh California Research Center is the only laboratory for which
communications with operations in Japan can be characterized as dense. The
center is directly controlled from Japan, and there seems to be a lot of
technology transfer, both formal and informal, between the Center and Japan.
Communications with Other Local Operations
All of the facilities' communications with the company's other
operations in the region are characterized by the interviewers to be loose. The
most significant communications with other local operations are often those
with the regional headquarters. For example, the director of the Canon
Research Center America reports to the president of Canon USA. The other
type of communications are those enhanced by the geographical proximity.
For example, the NEC Research Institute is housed at the same site with an
applied research group, the C&C Research Laboratory, which is owned by NEC
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U.S.A. This keeps the Institute from becoming an "ivory tower" and
provides access for the applied group to the basic research scientists.
External Technology Links
Most of the laboratories have strong links with an external center of
excellence, such as top-ranked universities and first-rate laboratories. In most
cases, these external links were brought about and have been kept by
employing top-notch researchers. The other side of the coin is that keeping
an external technology linkage is one of the key factors in choosing the
location of the laboratory. For example, the two founders of the Canon
Research Center America served as the faculty members at Stanford
University. The location of the facility was chosen so that these two people
would not lose their interaction with Stanford and other area professional
networks. Sony also mentioned that proximity to Rutgers University, which
has an important wireless communication laboratory, was an important
criterion for deciding on the location of its New Jersey Telecommunications
Laboratory.
Other types of efforts to maintain external technology links include
using the laboratory as a distribution point for ex gratia donations to
professors in U.S. universities (Ricoh), hosting some symposia and allowing
some thesis students to work under the direction of the laboratory's scientists
(NEC).
3.3. Divisional Laboratories
Members of the structured thesis group interviewed 14 divisional
laboratories of Japanese electronics firms in the U.S. They are:
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Fujitsu: Fujitsu Network Switching of America, Inc. (FNSA),
Fujitsu Network Transmission Systems, Inc. (FNTS),
Fujitsu Business Communication Systems, Inc. (FBCS),
Fujitsu Microelectronics, Inc. (FMI),
Fujitsu Computer Packaging Technologies, Inc. (FCPT),
Open Systems Solutions, Inc.,
Fujitsu Computer Products of America, Inc. (FCPA),
Ricoh: Strategic Technology and Applied Research Division,
FAX R&D Division,
Image Communications Systems Division,
Software Research Center,
Toshiba: Toshiba America MRI, Inc., (TAMI)
Vertex Semiconductor, and
Hitachi: Semiconductor Research Laboratory (SRL).
In addition to the above laboratories, the structured thesis members
collected information on U.S. divisional laboratories of Matsushita and Sony.
Establishment
Just like corporate laboratories, divisional laboratories of the Japanese
electronics firms have only a short history. Among the laboratories we
interviewed, the oldest is the R&D facility of Fujitsu Network Transmission
Systems, which was established in 1984. The rest of the laboratories were
established between 1988 and 1991.
One significant difference between corporate and divisional
laboratories at the establishment is that some of the divisional laboratories
have their roots in U.S. companies which were later acquired by Japanese
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companies. For example, Fujitsu's Open System Solutions, a former Unisoft
Corporation, was acquired in 1991; Toshiba America MRI, a former Diasonics
Corporation, was acquired in 1989; and another of Toshiba's R&D centers,
Vertex Semiconductor with its origin in 1974 as STC Research, was fully
acquired in 1991. On the other hand, all of the corporate laboratories were
established by the Japanese companies themselves.
Size
The size of the laboratories, measured by the number of researchers
and engineers, varies from 10 to 150. Fujitsu Computer Packaging
Technologies and Open Systems Solutions, Ricoh's four divisional
laboratories, and Hitachi's Semiconductor Research Laboratory each have 10-
25 researchers/engineers. The middle-sized groups are Fujitsu Business
Communications systems with 40, Fujitsu Network Transmission Systems
with 41, Toshiba's Vertex Semiconductor with 65, and Fujitsu
Microelectronics with 70. Laboratories with over 100 engineers are Toshiba
America MRI which has 110, Fujitsu Network Switching of America (130),
and Fujitsu Computer Products of America (150). (Exhibit 3-3: Interview
Summary - Divisional Laboratories)
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Exhibit 3-3: Interview Summary - Divisional Laboratories
Company/Laboratory Size Funding Mandate Manage- Communications Communications External
ment with home with local Technology
Style country operations Links
Fujitsu:
Fujitsu Network Switching of America >50 Corp+BU Dev., mod Japanese Dense Dense Customer, consultant
Fujitsu Network Transmission Systems <50 Jap+Local Dev., mod US Loose Dense Suppliers
Fujitsu Business Comm. Systems <50 Corp+BU Dev., mod Japanese Dense Dense Customers
Fujitsu Microelectronics >50 Corp+BU Dev., mod Japanese Dense Dense Sun Microsystems
Fujitsu Computer Packaging Technologies <50 Corp Applied US Dense Loose Customers, suppliers
Open Systems Solutions <50 Japan Dev US Dense Loose
Fujitsu Computer Products of America >50 BU Dev US Dense Loose
Ricoh:
Strategic Tech and Applied Research Div. <50 Contract Mod Japanese Loose Dense
FAX R&D Division <50 Contract Mod Japanese Loose Dense
Image Communications Systems Div. <50 Contract Dev Japanese Loose Dense
Software Research Center <50 Contract Dev Japanese Loose Dense
Toshiba:
Toshiba America MRI >50 BU Basic-Dev US Loose Loose UCSF
Vertex Semiconductor >50 Japan Dev US Loose Loose
Hitachi:
Semiconductor Research Laboratory <50 Corp Dev., mod US Loose Dense Stanford, Berkeley
Matsushita:
Panasonic Advanced TV-Video Lab <50 Local Dev N.A. N.A. N.A.
Sony:
(in general) Corp N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Corp.: corporate-level BU: business unit Dev.: product development Mod: product modification
Sources: Interviews and publicly available information.
.... .. ...
Funding
In most cases, funding for the divisional laboratories comes from their
parent company in Japan, some from the corporate-level budget and some
from the business unit or division level budget. In the case of Fujitsu, all of
the divisional laboratories except Fujitsu Network Transmission Systems are
fully funded from Japan. Fujitsu Network Transmission Systems is partly
funded by the local operations. Fujitsu is trying to increase the local funding
for its overseas divisional laboratories.
In the case of Panasonic Advanced TV-Video Laboratory of Matsushita,
its funding comes from the regional headquarters, Matsushita Electric
Corporation of America. This is because the laboratory belongs to the
regional headquarters but not to a product-line sector, as most of the
divisional laboratories do.
Another unique case is Ricoh. Ricoh's divisional laboratories receive
funds on a contractual basis.
Mandate
At division level laboratories, mandates are determined jointly with
headquarters in Japan and the laboratories. No divisional laboratories enjoy
as high degrees of autonomy as some of the corporate laboratories do.
Considering the nature of mandates -- much closer to commercialization
compared to those of corporate laboratories, this is probably to be expected.
All of the laboratories have partial or entire product development
and/or modification as their mandates. Involved in both product
development and modifications are Fujitsu Network Switching of America,
Fujitsu Network Transmission Systems, Fujitsu Business Communications
Systems, Fujitsu Microeclectronics, Toshiba America MRI, Hitachi's
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Semiconductor Research Laboratory. In addition to product development
and modification, Toshiba America MRI also conducts some basic research.
Involved mainly in product development are Fujitsu's Open Systems
Solutions, Fujitsu Computer Products of America, Ricoh's Image
Communications Systems Division and Software Research Center, Toshiba's
Vertex Semiconductor, and Sony's four divisional laboratories. Involved
mainly in product modification are Ricoh's R&D centers at Strategic
Technology and Applied Research Division and FAX R&D Division. Fujitsu
Computer Packaging Technologies defines its mandate as applied research,
and Matsushita's Panasonic Advanced TV-Video Laboratory undertakes long-
term R&D to provide advanced technologies critical to future regional
market.
Management Style
Although none of the divisional laboratories are transformed into the
genuine Japanese style management, some of them have adopted more
aspects of their parent company in management than the corporate
laboratories. Included in this group are Fujitsu Network Switching of
America, Fujitsu Business Communications Systems, Fujitsu
Microelectronics, and Ricoh's four divisional laboratories. One common
factor for these seven facilities are that they work closely with the local
operations, especially with manufacturing, whose management style is more
Japanese in an effort to adopt competitive Japanese manufacturing methods.
Also, these seven R&D centers often have Japanese managers as a corporate
head and/or as a financial officer. Based on the interview results, it seems
that such Japanization of the divisional laboratories was not intentionally
planned. A manager at Fujitsu Network Switching of America stated that
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they wanted to keep the proportion of Japanese assignees to less than 10% to
show that FNSA is an American company and that it is Americans that are
doing R&D.
While there is an attempt to keep "America" in these R&D centers on
one hand, there also are efforts to reduce cultural conflict with the Japanese
expatriates and the headquarters in Japan on the other hand. For example, all
of the employees at Fujitsu Network Switching of America have to take some
cross-cultural training. A similar training is also available at Fujitsu Network
Transmission Systems.
Communications with Home Country
Communications with the home country headquarters from divisional
R&D centers seem to be denser than those of corporate laboratories. Six
laboratories were perceived by interviewers to have dense communications
with the home country. Those six laboratories all belong to Fujitsu; namely,
Fujitsu Network Switching of America, Fujitsu Business Communications
Systems, Fujitsu Microelectronics, Fujitsu Computer Packaging Technologies,
Open Systems Solutions, Fujitsu Computer Products of America. Those
which have loose communications are Fujitsu Network Transmission
Systems, Ricoh's four laboratories, and Hitachi's Semiconductor Research
Laboratory. Classification for Toshiba, Matsushita, and Sony was not possible.
There are two main reasons for divisional laboratories' denser
communications with the home country. Firstly, some of the products
developed in these divisional laboratories are commercialized back in Japan
(e.g., Fujitsu Business Communication Systems, Ricoh's four laboratories,
and Sony's two laboratories). Therefore, to those laboratories,
communications with the Japanese counterpart are critical to carry out their
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mandates. Secondly, unlike corporate laboratories, there are some Japanese
expatriates in most of these divisional laboratories. It is those Japanese
assignees who play important role in communications with Japan.
Popular modes of communications include electronics mail and face-
to-face meetings.
As the frequency of the communication increases, problems related to
cross-Pacific communications also rise. The most common problems are
language and cultural gaps and the difference in approach in project
management. There are some examples for the latter type of problems: the
Japanese are less concerned about the total system when they develop a
subunit 31; the Japanese do not use project management tools (e.g., systems
planning) which the Americans are used to; and the Japanese are organized
by project while the Americans are organized by specialty.
Communications with Other Local Operations
Communications with other local operations are significantly denser
than those of corporate laboratories. Four out of seven Fujitsu's laboratories
(Fujitsu Network Switching of America, Fujitsu Network Transmission
Systems, Fujitsu Business Communications Systems, and Fujitsu
Microelectronics), all the four Ricoh's laboratories, and Hitachi's
Semiconductor Research Laboratory are categorized as having dense
communications. Also, Toshiba's Vertex is reported to be increasing the
communications with the local operations. Those which were categorized to
have loose communications are Fujitsu Computer Packaging Technologies,
31The Americans are often characterized as a specialist, who lacks overall view, and the
Japanese as a generalist, who can have an overall picture. However, we received the opposite
observation from one of our interviewees.
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Open Systems Solutions, Fujitsu Computer Products of America, and Toshiba
America MRI.
As the communication density increases among the local operations,
problems also increase. For example, Fujitsu Network Transmission Systems
has difficulty in communications between manufacturing and R&D. This
difficulty is due not to the differences in "manufacturing" and "R&D" but to
the cultural and language differences between the Japanese and the
Americans: many of the manufacturing managers are Japanese and almost
all of the R&D managers are American. The company expects a new
American director, who was a professor at Carnegie Mellon University and
spent two and a half years in one of Fujitsu's main factories, to address the
communication problem.
Another interesting example of communications problems within the
local operation is that within Toshiba America MRI. They claim that there is
a strong cultural difference between the academic group staying at the
University of California San Francisco and the engineers which makes
communications between the two groups very difficult.
External Technological Links
While most of the external technological links of the corporate
laboratories are limited to top-notch universities, laboratories, and
professional societies, those of the divisional laboratories include suppliers
and customers as well. This reflects the more product oriented nature of
mandates of these divisional laboratories.
Links with academics were claimed by Toshiba America MRI (with
University of California San Francisco) and Hitachi Semiconductor Research
Laboratory (with Stanford University and University of California Berkeley).
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In the case of Toshiba, the company had relations with UCSF before the
acquisition of Diasonic. Toshiba maintained the relationship by having 13 of
its 110 engineers stationed at UCSF. Fourteen more people, who are UCSF
employees, are also assisting this team, which is working on the new
generation MRI technology. UCSF is located one mile away from Toshiba
America MRI. In the case of Hitachi, it has an advisory board that meets
every 4-6 months with a panel of academics to discuss the key thrusts of the
research and brainstorm new ideas.
The importance of strong links with customers was mentioned
especially by R&D centers in the telecommunications industry. Location of
Fujitsu Network Transmission Systems shows its strong link with a
customer. The current location of Fujitsu Network Transmission Systems
was decided on the request of MCI, who then had a plan to come to Dallas,
Texas. Currently, MCI has a large facility nearby. Fujitsu Network Switching
of America also expressed the importance of communications with lead
users, regional bell companies, to develop marketable products.
Other types of external technological links are: Fujitsu Computer
Packaging Technologies' alliance with material companies, such as Du Pont
or Dow Chemical; and Open Systems Solutions relations with Sun
Microsystems in the area of ASICs.
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Chapter 4: Fit Between Globalization Strategy and Internationalization of
R&D
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the fit between the
globalization strategy and the direction of internationalization of R&D in
Japanese electronics firms. First, the expected patterns of internationalization
of R&D based on Chapters 1 and 2 are discussed. Then, the actual patterns of
internationalization of R&D are discussed based on the data provided in
Chapter 3.
4.1. Expected Patterns of Internationalization of R&D
In Section 1.3.2., the current globalization strategies of the eight
Japanese electronics firms were categorized into four different groups. The
expected patterns of internationalization of R&D based on that categorization
are presented in Exhibit 4-1, and discussed type by type in the following pages.
Locally Autonomous
This type of strategy puts strong emphasis on the completeness of a
value chain in each region. Therefore, the expected pattern of R&D centers is
that overseas R&D centers are strongly connected to local manufacturing and
sales operations. The relations among R&D centers in the region are also
expected to be strong. Ideally, the technology level of R&D centers should be
high enough to develop products sold in the region without help from other
part of the company.
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Mesh/Matrix
This type of strategy tries to maintain both product-line and regional
links. Therefore, the expected pattern of R&D is that overseas R&D centers
are both well connected to local operations and their counterpart R&D centers
in their respective research areas.
Transnational
This type of strategy tries to utilize innovations occurring at both
parent company headquarters and local subsidiaries. This purpose is
achieved through the transnational's self-reinforcing network mechanism,
which is based on interdependence among different operations. Therefore,
the roles of each R&D centers would be expected to be designed to enhance
interdependence. Because of the flexibility of a transnational, the density of
linkages with the home country and local operations varies according to the
role of each R&D center as long as the R&D center is included in the network
in some way.
Others
Fujitsu was not categorized into any of the above groups. It is not clear
what type of internationalized R&D organization will be created based on the
company's emphasis on "existing and prospering together" and "cross
culture". However, it is clear that Fujitsu should adopt a local style of
management in its R&D facilities to realize what it refers to as "cross culture".
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Exhibit 4-1: Patterns of Internationalization of R&D
Types of strategy Characteristics of Overseas R&D
Locally autonomous * Strongly connected within the
different level of R&D and to the rest
of the value chain in the region
* Self-sufficient
Mesh/Matrix * Strongly connected to both product-
and regional line
Transnational * Interdependent among different
units
* Included in the corporate-wide
network, but the density of
communication varies
Others (cross culture) * Respect local way of management
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4.2. Actual Patterns of Internationalization of R&D: Observation from R&D
Centers in the U.S.
4.2.1. Disconnected Value Chain
Stand-alone Corporate Laboratories
It was noticeable that all of the corporate laboratories are characterized
by the interviewers as having loose communications with both the home
country and the local operations, regardless of the type of globalization
strategy. Corporate laboratories are described as a "stand-alone" type. This
does not fit any of the expected internationalized R&D organizations
discussed in Section 4.1. (Exhibit 4-2: Observed Pattern of Internationalization
of R&D)
Divisional Laboratories Developing Links with Home Country and Local
Operations
Internal linkages at the 14 laboratories, which were observed by the
structured thesis members, are broken down into four different patterns. The
first pattern is that the laboratory has linkages with both the home country
and the local operations. Three Fujitsu R&D centers in charge of product
modifications are in this group. The second is that the laboratory has linkages
only with local operations. This is the most commonly observed pattern: six
laboratories, in charge of product development and/or modifications are
categorized into this group. However, these facilities do not have dense
connections with the regional corporate laboratories (when applicable).
Therefore, their linkages with the local facilities are one-sided. The third
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group is that of the laboratory which has linkages only with the home
Exhibit 4-2: Disconnected Observed Pattern of Internationalization
_ : loose linkage S : dense linkage
Source: Created by the author
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Corporate-level laboratory: stand-alone
I I
Divisional laboratory: Pattern 1
Divisional laboratory: Pattern 2
Divisional laboratory: Pattern 3
Divisional laboratory: Pattern 4
B-T
country. Three R&D centers in charge of product development or applied
research are in this category. The last category is that of the laboratory which
has only loose linkages with both the home country and local operations.
Two laboratories are categorized in this pattern.
Disconnected Linkages
In summary, most of the R&D centers of the Japanese electronics firms
are described as having disconnected linkages. Aside from Fujitsu, which
does not have a clear picture for the linkages of its internationalized
organizations, and NEC, whose target is to become a transnational
corporation, this does not fit into the companies' immediate goal of
globalization to establish a whole value chain in the region. Even though the
companies establish elements of the value chain, if these elements are not
connected to create a value, that can not be called a value chain. (Exhibit 4-3:
Disconnected Value Chain)
Exhibit 4-3: Disconnected Value Chain
1 _
t Disconnected
Note: There are such cases that produciton and marketing in a same region are
disconnected.
Source: Created by the author
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4.2.2. Reasons for the disconnected value chain
There are a number of explanations for the disconnected value chain. They
are the relatively short history of these R&D centers, difficulties in
communications, and little need for linkages.
1. R&D centers are still new.
One strong explanation for the disconnected linkages is that these R&D
centers have only a few years of history, and therefore, are still in the process
of building linkages. For example, Toshiba's Vertex Semiconductor is
reported to have been witnessing an increase in its communications with
both the home country and the local operations.
2. Communication difficulties.
Another possible reason for loose linkages is the difficulty in
communications. Two types of communications difficulties among the local
operations were pointed out in the previous chapter. One is the difficulty in
communication between the Japanese and Americans. This difficulty is
attributable to the differences in language and culture. The other type of
difficulty is attributable to the differences between academic type of
researchers and more product oriented researchers. With these difficulties in
communications, linkages will not develop unless there is a strong necessity
or force to create them.
3. Little need for intra-country linkages.
Despite the first reason, there are some R&D centers whose linkages
with local operations are unlikely to strengthen in the foreseeable future.
This is especially true among corporate-level laboratories whose research is
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more basic. Unless the product development capability of the local operations
is fully developed, it is difficult for a local product development function to
exploit the research findings by the basic research laboratory. In order to have
a fully developed product development capability, a strong local production
function is required in turn. Thus, as long as each of the local functions lacks
a reasonable level of self-sufficiency and breadth of technologies, there is no
incentive for basic research centers and product-development centers to
strengthen the linkages between them. If we also consider the cultural and
language differences discussed above, it is sometimes more efficient and
reasonable for the company to link elements of a local value chain via
headquarters.
This last explanation for the disconnected value chain suggests a
fundamental question about the idea of creating an autonomous whole value
chain in each region. Are the locally autonomous operations and the matrix
type of organization the optimal direction for the Japanese firms? Based on
the insights from the current status of the linkages provided by R&D centers,
the following chapter re-examines global strategy of the Japanese electronics
firms.
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Chapter 5: Toward A Transnational Corporation
Observations of the Japanese electronics firms' R&D centers in the U.S.
throw up a fundamental question about the firms' globalization strategy of
building a self-sufficient autonomous regional value chain. In this chapter,
we will re-examine the globalization strategy of these firms, which was
described in Chapter 1.
5.1. Globalization Strategy Re-examined
In this section, the most common strategies among the Japanese
electronics firms -- "locally autonomous" type and "matrix" type, will be
examined. Then, a transnational strategy will be suggested as a solution to
some of the problems the Japanese electronics firms are facing.
Bartlett and Ghoshal break down a company's competitiveness into
three types of capabilities -- efficiency, responsiveness, and learning
capabilities. They argue that the successful companies in the past are those
who could match the organization's capability with the key needs of the
industry (e.g., efficiency in consumer electronics, responsiveness in toiletry
products, and learning in switching industry). However, changes in those
business environments mean that more and more businesses being driven by
simultaneous demands for global efficiency, national responsiveness, and
worldwide leveraging of innovations and learning.
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5.1.1. Locally Autonomous Strategy Re-examined
The "locally autonomous strategy" is the "multinational" strategy of
Bartlett and Ghoshal's definition. The strength of this strategy is national
responsiveness. In addition, having the whole value chain in one area
makes it easier to be recognized as a local player. Thus, this strategy helps to
obtain subsidies from the local government and to avoid political friction and
foreign exchange risks. The weaknesses of this strategy is the difficulty to
achieve efficiency because of each regional operation's relatively small size
and the difficulty in learning across borders.
Considering the characteristics of the industry (scale economy is still
more important than national responsiveness) and the historical evolution
of the Japanese electronics firms' overseas operations discussed in Chapter 1,
the main reason for these companies to stress a locally autonomous strategy
in the advanced countries seems to be to avoid increasing trade friction and
currency exchange risks. Since establishment of R&D centers do not directly
help in reducing the foreign exchange risk, the main reason for establishing
R&D centers as a part of the value chain can be summarized as creating an
image as a local player in order to reduce political frictions, which is addressed
by Westney as one of the two competition factors.
5.1.2. Matrix Strategy Re-examined
In theory, the matrix organization is the organization which can enable
a company to maintain balance among centralized efficiency, local
responsiveness, and the building and leveraging of functional
competencies. 32 However, this ideal type of organization has turned out to
3 2Bartlett and Ghoshal, Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution, (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 31.
67
be unsuccessful in history. The problems with this organization are (1)
amplification of the differences in perspectives and interests by forcing all
issues through the dual chains of command, (2) barriers of distance, time,
language, and culture, and (3) consequent slow, acrimonious, and costly
management processes. The aim of the Japanese firms' adopting this strategy
seems to be to combine the strength of their divisional organization, which is
designed based on product lines to exploit global efficiency with the need to
become a local player.
5.1.3. Danger With These Two Strategies
After re-examination of the Japanese electronics firms' globalization
strategy, it becomes clear that one of the main reasons for R&D globalization
is to create the image of a local player. However, it is apparent that the
current status of intra-country linkages between R&D centers is far from
contributing to a value chain in that country. In addition, at the end of
Chapter 4, it is pointed out that it might not be optimal to create a self-
sufficient autonomous value chain in each region. With such a weak
incentive for creating linkages, the progress toward perfecting a whole value
chain must be very slow.
The current status and expected slowness in the progress of localization
may jeopardize each strategy's original goal -- to create the image of a local
player. If the Japanese companies continue to state their immediate goal as
establishing a self-sufficient autonomous regional company but cannot get
closer to that goal, it will be addressed by the mass media and/or the
academics at some time. Then, the Japanese companies will be labeled as
deceiving the locals. That will ruin the Japanese electronics firms' original
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goal to enhance their image as local players. Indeed, it will result in a worse
image.
5..2. Transnational Model as a Solution to Image Problem
The transnational model by Bartlett and Ghoshal discussed in Chapter
1 could become a solution to the above image problem because the model can
justify what the Japanese companies have been doing.
Instead of centralizing or decentralizing assets, the transnational makes
selective decisions. The resource configuration of the transnational is
summarized as follows:
(1) Certain resources and capabilities are best centralized within the home
country operation, not only to realize scale economies, but also to protect
certain core competencies and to provide the necessary supervision of
corporate management.
(2) Certain other resources are also centralized by the transnational, but not
necessarily in the home country.
(3) Some other resources may be best decentralized, on a local-for-local
basis. 33
Based on this model, the Japanese companies can claim that their
disconnected linkages are due to selective decisions on centralization and
decentralization. For example, currently-observable linkages between product
development, modification functions and manufacturing functions can be
explained as decentralization of a certain product line whose benefit from
being located in a certain country is large. The same company's disconnected
33 Bartlett and Ghoshal, Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution, (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 60.
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linkages with the corporate laboratory can be also explained in the selective
decisions on centralization and decentralization. In this case, the company
can claim that the corporate laboratory function is decentralized for a reason
other than the localization of production and development facilities, which is
often true.
In this way, adopting a transnational model enables the Japanese
companies to maintain their public image. The transnational model can
explain without using the vision of "establishing a self-sufficient
autonomous company" why a company has various elements of a value
chain, including high-value added activities like R&D, in the U.S. and yet
these elements are not always connected to one another.
5.3. Transnational Model as a Solution to Management Problems?
The transnational strategy could be very effective for protecting the
Japanese companies from damaging their public image. But, that is not the
only thing the transnational model can do: the concept of the transnational
model may enable a more practical and solid way of building a globalization
strategy. However, the problem is that even in the descriptions by Bartlett
and Ghoshal, it is not clear how to build a transnational corporation.
5.3.1. Essence of Transnational
In addition to its flexibility in resource configuration and
interdependence among different units, the transnational model has different
change process from those of the multinational and the matrix strategies. It
emphasizes transnational mentality and administrative heritage.
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Transnational mentality
Central to the transnational model is the "transnational mentality" -- a
shared understanding of the company's purposes and values, an
identification with broader goals, and commitment to the overall corporate
agenda by individual managers. This is the global glue, which works against
enormous forces of fragmentation and dissipation emerged from built-in
flexibility of the transnational model. 34 Bartlett and Ghoshal argues that a
change in mentality should come first and a change in formal organizations
should follow, while in the traditional strategies changes in structure comes
first and mentality of the managers can not follow such changes, resulting in
disharmony in the organization. (Exhibit 5-1: Traditional and Emerging
Change Processes) This view on the importance of shared vision is also
supported by Kenichi Ohmae. He states in The Borderless World:
"Formal systems and organizational structures can help, but only to the
extent that they nurture and support intangible ties."3 5
Importance of administrative heritage
Another important element of the transnational model is its emphasis
on administrative heritage, which is defined by Bartlett and Ghoshal as
"where the companies come from." They argue that successful
transformation to a transnational company can be brought about by building
on the company's current strengths and supplementing its current
weaknesses. Although, in conceptual terms, different companies are
gradually transforming into a similar transnational form, the different
34Bartlett and Ghoshal, Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution, (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 175.
35Ohmae, The Borderless World, (New York: Harper Business, 1990), 89
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administrative heritage of each company makes the adaptation process very
different in operative terms.36
Exhibit 5-1: Traditional and Emerging Change Processes
The Traditional Change Process
Change in Formal Structure and Responsibilities
(Anatomy)
Change in Interpersonal Relationships and Processes
(Physiology)
Change in Individual Attitudes and Mentalities
(Psychology)
The Emerging Change Process
Change in Individual Attitudes and Mentalities
Change in Interpersonal Relationships and Processes
Change in Formal Structure and Responsibilities
Source: Bartlett and Ghoshal, Managing Across Borders:
Solution
36Ohmae, The Borderless World, (New York: Harper Business, 1990), 55.
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The Transnational
5.3.2. Implications to Internationalization of R&D by the Japanese Electronics
Firms
The most important implication of the transnational model is
that the Japanese electronics firms' R&D centers in the U.S. will continue to
play an important strategic role. Even in the transnational model, the
assumption is that a major market country like the U.S. will be a "strategic
leader" in at least some product or major technology. This means that
expansion of technology capabilities in the U.S. by Japanese firms, which
started a few years ago, will continue in the future.
Then, what are the implications of the transnational model in the
actual process of developing R&D centers in the U.S.? Unfortunately, the
transnational model does not say much about how a company can become a
transnational. Due to differing administrative heritage, the way to become a
transnational varies from company to company, and even from unit to unit.
Each company should evaluate their strengths and weaknesses, and
implement incremental changes. There is no single formula for everyone.
However, there is one clear starting point. The transnational model
can link the disconnected units without major re-organization nor re-
configuration of assets: the suggestion is linking the disconnected units
through a transnational mentality. This approach works even for the stand-
alone corporate laboratory. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the NEC
Research Institute defines its mandate based on the C&C philosophy of
NEC. 37 Even though communications at the NEC Research Institute are
characterized as loose, a vision commonly shared by the rest of the
corporation prevents the researchers at the Institute from "deviation." If
there is no strong vision shared between the company as a whole and the
37C&C stands for computer and communication.
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managers of the very autonomous corporate laboratories, the freedom these
managers are enjoying could provoke envy from the rest of the company.
Also, the chance for the company to fail in leveraging the research findings
will increase. In this way, creating a "transnational mentality" in each
individual manager can be a significant element of managing even R&D
centers with a strong preference toward autonomy and a lack of culture fit
with the rest of the company.
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Conclusion
A few years ago, induced by the marketing, political, and science/
technology factors, increasing number of the Japanese electronics firms started
to locate R&D functions in the U.S. Structured interviews at these R&D
centers revealed that the corporate-level laboratories tend to have loose
communications with both the home country and the local operations, and
are characterized as stand-alone facilities. The divisional laboratories are
observed to have more linkages with the rest of the company, though the
linkages are much weaker and more difficult to keep than those observed in
the home country. Such a weak intra-country linkage does not fit the
Japanese companies' globalization strategy, which often emphasizes
establishing locally autonomous operations. This mismatch creates a threat
that works against protecting a "good local player" image of the Japanese
firms, one of their most important reasons for locating high-value added
activities in the U.S.
The transnational model, a new model of a corporation operating
internationally, is suggested as a solution to potential loss of image. Also, the
transnational model implies the importance of having R&D centers in the
U.S. Finally, a transnational mentality can be presented as a measure to
integrate R&D centers.
Although adoption of a transnational model sounds like a perfect
solution to managing internationalization of R&D, the model by itself hardly
suggests any concrete formula for success. Because of its emphasis on
building on administrative heritage, the way to reach transnational status
differs from company to company, and from unit to unit. The one clear thing
is that the transformation toward becoming a transnational company starts in
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each manager's mind through developing a "transnational mentality." As
put in Bartlett and Ghoshal's words:
"Fundamentally, they are evolving a common vision about managing across
borders. This vision recognizes the importance of administrative heritage
both as an asset to protect and as a constraint to overcome. Another central
belief is that the first step toward developing the multidimensional strategic
competencies needed in transnational businesses is to build organizational
capabilities. Such a management mentality, more than any particular
organizational form or strategic posture, is at the heart of what we call the
transnational organization."38 (emphasis by the author)
For those interested in the evolution of internationalization of R&D,
the transnational model suggests a new challenge for approaching the
internationalization of R&D; that is, to measure the level of
"internationalization" by the level of the "transnational mentality" rather
than the development in visible organization or actual level of
communications as examined in this thesis. Although examining the
invisible is a difficult task, this approach might more clearly reveal strengths
and weaknesses of the internationalization of R&D, or globalization in
general, by Japanese electronics firms.
38 Bartlett and Ghoshal, Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution, (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 55.
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Appendix 1: Company Profiles
Canon, Inc.
Company Description:
Major manufacturer of copiers, cameras and computer peripherals. Known
around the world for its cameras and copiers, Cannon has expanded its
product lines to become a comprehensive producer of OA and computer
equipment. While enjoying expanding overseas sales across all product
categories, the company has moved aggressively to increase its foreign
production capacity with new plants in Asia and expanded capacity in the U.S.
and Europe.
Main Products:
Copiers and copier supplies, computer peripherals, image systems, computer
and information systems, cameras and video equipment, medical equipment,
and others.
Incorporation: January 1, 1937
(Consolidated, in Ymillion)
3/1991 3/1990 3/1989
Net sales 1,727,948 1,350,917 1,106,010
Net Income 61,408 38,293 37,100
77
Fujitsu Ltd.
Company Description:
Engaged in the manufacture and sale of computers, communications
equipment and electronics components. Japan's leading computer
manufacturer, Fujitsu also enjoys a strong presence in domestic
semiconductor and telecommunications markets. R&D expenditure, which
has exceeded 10% of total sales in recent years, continues to stress mainline
products with 64 megabyte DRAMs and 64 kilobyte SRAMs utilizing HEMTs
receiving special attention.
Main Products:
Computer equipment, telephone and telegraph apparatus, and electronic
components.
Incorporation: June 20, 1935
(Consolidated, in Ymillion)
3/1991 3/1990 3/1989
Net sales 2,971,462 2,549,773 2,387,442
Net Income 82,673 86,758 69,948
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Hitachi, Ltd.
Company Description:
Nation's largest comprehensive manufacturer of heavy electric plant and
equipment. The company has many promising subsidiaries in varied fields,
including chemicals, wire and cable manufacturing and shipbuilding. The
company is also expanding into the aerospace field.
Main Products:
Heavy electric plant, consumer electronics, communications and electronic
equipment, industrial machinery and plants, traffic equipment, and aerospace
equipment.
Incorporation: January 1, 1920
(Consolidated, in ¥million)
3/1991 3/1990 3/1989
Net sales 7,736,961 7,077,855 6,401,417
Net Income 230,185 210,963 185,587
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Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
Company Description:
One of the world's largest consumer electronics manufacturers, the company
is the nucleus of the Matsushita group. The company has about 75 overseas
manufacturing subsidiaries and 26 sales companies worldwide. The company
exports its products under the 'National', 'Panasonic', 'Technics', and
'Quasar' brands.
Main Products:
Consumer electronics, communications equipment, industrial equipment,
electronic components, semiconductors, and laser equipment.
Incorporation: January 1, 1918
(Consolidated, in Ymillion)
3/1991 3/1990 3/1989
Net sales 6,599,306 6,002,786 5,504,250
Net Income 258,914 235,561 213,462
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Mitsubishi Electric Corp.
Company Description:
Ranks third among comprehensive electric machinery makers. Top in
defense electronics. Has tieup with Westinghouse (U.S.) in nuclear power.
Friendly with Sperry Ranc (U.S.) in computers, but actually oriented toward
compatibility with IBM. Bolstering semiconductors to catch up in field of
electronics.
Main Products:
Industrial machinery, turbine generators, electronic equipment,
programmable controllers, and semiconductors.
(Consolidated, in Ymillion)
3/1991 3/1990 3/1989
Net sales 3,316,243 2,976,420 2,716,818
Net Income 79,760 76,796 53,236
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NEC Corporation
Company Description:
Manufacturer of computers, communications equipment and various
electronics products. The world's largest producer of semiconductors and a
recognized leader among Japan's high-tech industries, NEC Corp. relies
heavily upon the sale of personal computer products, a product category in
which the company enjoys a commanding market share and which has
continued to exhibit strong growth. Systems integrating computers and
communications equipment have been targeted for development as part of
long range corporate strategy.
Main Products:
Computers & computer components, and communications equipment.
Incorporation: January 1, 1909
(Consolidated, in Ymillion)
3/1991 3/1990 3/1989
Net sales 3,316,243 3,444,177 3,082,800
Net Income 79,760 85,219 64,477
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Ricoh Co., Ltd.
Company Description:
A leading supplier of office automation equipment, including copiers,
facsimile equipment and data processing systems. The company is also
involved in electronic devices and components, and is also known for its
cameras. In fiscal 1991, copiers and related supplies provided 53.2% of net
sales, communications and information systems, 33.6%, and other products,
13.2%.
Main Products:
Copiers and related supplies, facsimile equipment, data processing
equipment, and other products.
Incorporation: February 6, 1936
(Consolidated, in Ymillion)
3/1991 3/1990 3/1989
Net sales 1,003,263 835,464 729,411
Net Income 13,557 15,871 17,795
83
Sony Corporation
Company Description:
Comprehensive electronics maker with a worldwide network of distributions
outlets. The company's audio equipment still yields the largest percentage of
sales but the company is moving into higher value-added lines of business
including optical discs and materials for the communications industry. Sony
made headlines with the multi-million dollar acquisition of CBS Records and
is pursuing market share in the movie and home entertainment industries.
Has recently developed a final version for the mini disc music recording
format, and has entered licensing negotiations with EMI and Warner Music.
Main Products:
Household audio and video equipment, and electronic data storage media.
Incorporation: May 1, 1946
(Consolidated, in Ymillion)
3/1991 3/1990 3/1989
Net sales 3,690,776 2,945,242 2,201,472
Net Income 116,925 102,808 72,469
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Toshiba Corporation
Company Description:
Toshiba is a major world electronics producer ranking second in Japan behind
Hitachi. Through extensive R&D the company is advancing into high value-
added information-related products. Expanding into communications field
with overseas tie-ups with major foreign firms including Siemens, Olivetti,
AT&T, and recently, IBM. The company will be a major competitor in the
development and marketing of HDTV and broadcast satellites.
Main Products:
Information processing equipment and systems, Telecommunications
equipment, Control systems, medical systems, semiconductors, automated
equipment, electric tubes, other electronic components, power plant systems,
industrial electrical apparatus, transportation equipment, machinery,
household products, and lighting equipment.
Incorporation: July 1, 1875
(Consolidated, in Ymillion)
3/1991 3/1990 3/1989
Net sales 4,695,394 4,251,953 3,800,857
Net Income 120,852 131,836 119,402
Sources: COMLINE Corporate Directory, Japan Company Handbook, and S&P
Corporate Descriptions
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Appendix 2: Structured Interview Questionnaire
1. How are the general strategies and goals for overseas centers formulated?
Do the overseas lab heads participate in strategy formation with the
headquarters R&D organization?
2. How are budgets decided for overseas R&D expenditures? What, in general
terms, are the expectations for changes over the coming five to ten years?
3. What are the criteria for assessing the performance of overseas R&D
centers?
4. To whom do the directors of overseas labs report? What is the formal
relationship between the central R&D centers and the overseas centers?
5. One of the major themes of current research in corporate strategy is the
importance of strategic groups: that is, the set of companies that your own
company uses to benchmark or assess its competitive strength and its
performance. What companies are important points of reference for your
company as you develop R&D strategies outside Japan?
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Appendix 3: Structured Thesis Members and Thesis Titles
Cooper, Simon
Dewar, Bruce
Horowitz, Eduardo
Ijiri, Haruhisa
Izquierdo, Armando
Jordan, John R.
Otterstatter, Jonathan
Shryock, Richard S.
Sommer, Robert W.
Voisey, Christopher
Wojciehowski, Bart
Yasseen, Fareed
"The Strategic Development of Offshore R&D
Facilities by High Technology companies: TI
and Hitachi - A Comparative Study"
"Internationalization of Research &
Development: Identification of Trends and
Issues"
"Technology Strategy and the
Internationalization of R&D in the Japanese
Electronics Industry"
"Japanese R&D Centers in the United States:
Their Role in the Evolution of Global
Management"
"Internationalization of Technology in the Oil
Industry"
"The Internationalization of R&D: Alignment
of Strategy and Human Resource Management
Practices"
"Strategic Alliances: The Challenge of a
Necessity"
"The Internationalization of Japanese Research
and Development: Strategy and
Implementation"
"Building Internal Knowledge Networks in the
Multinational Corporation: A Study of
International R&D"
"Issues in the Internationalization of Research
and Development in High Technology
Companies"
"Staffing Strategies for the Internationalization
of R&D"
"European R&D Efforts in the United States:
The Case of Swiss Pharmaceuticals"
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